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This thesis addresses vulnerabilities in current Trusted Computing architecture by explor-
ing a design for a better Trusted Platform Module (TPM); one that integrates more closely
with the CPU’s Memory Management Unit (MMU). We establish that software-based
attacks on trusted memory can be carried out undetectably byan adversary on current
TCG/TPM implementations. We demonstrate that an attacker with sufficient privileges can
compromise the integrity of a TPM-protected system by modifying critical loaded code and
static data after measurement has taken place. More specifically, these attacks illustrate the
Time Of Check vs. Time of Use (TOCTOU) class of attacks.
We propose to enhance the MMU, enabling it to detect when memory containing trusted
code or data is being maliciously modified at run-time. On detection, it should be able to
notify the TPM of these modifications. We seek to use the concepts of selective memory
immutability as a security tool to harden the MMU, which willresult in a more robust
TCG/TPM implementation. To substantiate our ideas for thisproposed hardware feature,
we designed and implemented a software prototype system, which employs the monitoring
capabilities of the Xen virtual machine monitor.
We performed a security evaluation of our prototype and validated that it can detect all
our software-based TOCTOU attacks. We applied our prototype o verify the integrity of
data associated with an application, as well as suggested and implemented ways to pre-
vent unauthorized use of data by associating it with its owner process. Our performance
evaluation reveals minimal overhead.
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For many, ”Trusted Computing” is a term that has come to mean th t the system will behave
as expected, consistently. TheTrusted Computing Group(TCG) 1 [19] is a consortium that
works toward developing and advancing open standards for trusted computing across plat-
forms of multiple types. Their main goals are to increase thetrust level of a system by
allowing it to be remotely verifiable and to aid users in protecting their sensitive informa-
tion, such as passwords and keys, from compromise. The core component of the proposal
is theTrusted Platform Module(TPM) .
A TPM is a micro-controller chip, mounted on the motherboardof a computer, that can
be used to provide a range of hardware-based security features to programs that know how
to use them. In the last few years, major vendors of computer systems have been shipping
machines that have included TPMs, with associated BIOS support.
TPMs provide a hardware-basedroot of trustthat can be extended to include associated
software. Each link in the chain of trust extends its trust tothe subsequent one. A TPM
provides internal storage space for storing cryptographickeys and other security critical in-
formation. It provides cryptographic functions for encryption/decryption, signing/verifying
as well as hardware-based random number generation. TPM functionalities can be used to
1Formerly known as theTrusted Computing Platform Alliance(TCPA)
1
attest the initial configuration of the underlying computing platform, as well as to seal and
bind data to a specific platform configuration.
However, current TPM-based approaches of attesting to the integrity of critical code
and data are not foolproof and can be circumvented2 by malicious adversaries. While it is
hard to tamper with the hardware, it is much easier to subvertth software.
A major drawbackof the TCG architecture is that it only provides load-time guaran-
tees. Integrity measurements are taken just before the software is loaded into memory, and
it is assumed that the loaded in-memory software remains unchanged. However, this is not
necessarily true – an adversary can exploit the difference between when software is mea-
sured and when it is actually used, to induce run-time vulnerabilities. This is an instance
of theTime Of Check vs. Time of Use(TOCTOU) class of attacks.
In its current implementation, the TPM holds only static measurements and so these
malicious changes will not be reflected in its state. Code that is correct at the time of
hashing may be modified by the time of its use. Change-after-hashing is a considerable
threat to securing elements in the TCG architecture.
A possiblesolutionto this limitation is to have the CPU’sMemory Management Unit
(MMU) modified to work more closely with the TPM. The MMU should be made aware of
the software that has been measured at load-time, and shouldbe able to signal to the TPM
when the memory corresponding to that loaded software is being changed in malicious
ways at run-time.
To explore and test our ideas with regard to this solution to the limitations in the TCG
architecture, we use the monitoring capabilities of Xen – anopen-sourceVirtual Machine
Monitor (VMM) for x86. Our implementation is a software proof-of-concept demonstra-
tion of a proposed hardware (MMU) feature.
2Evan Sparks and Kwang-Hyun Baek of the Dartmouth PKI/Trust laboratory are investigating power
analysis, physical, and software attacks on TPMs.
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1.1 Contribution
This thesis makes the following contributions:
• demonstration of a vulnerability in the current TCG/TPM architecture, a set of software-
based attacks which exploit this vulnerability, and the realization that such vulnera-
bilities allow for undetectable tampering of trusted memory;
• a working prototype system with minimal overhead that allows for the detection of
such attacks by monitoring trusted page table entries and physical frames of RAM;
• the application of our prototype to verify the integrity of data, such as configuration
files, associated with an application;
• a suggestion and implementation of how to associate sensitive data with the process
that owns it, so as to prevent unauthorized use of the data; and
• the recommendation of having a closer binding between the MMU and the TPM, so
that the detection that is currently done by Xen could be doneby the MMU.
1.2 Motivating Example
Certification Authorities(CA) are the keystone of mostPublic Key Infrastructures(PKI).
They act as trusted third parties by using their private key to sign certificates. Each cer-
tificate binds together a public key and some information (usually identity – such as name,
address, organization etc.) about the holder of the corresponding private key. However,
CAs are known to be expensive and complicated to install and maintain. The CA-in-a-
Box [6] project aimed at addressing these problems by helping small enterprises (such as,
a university) deploy PKI in an easy and cost-effective manner.
3
That project developed tools using open-source software (Op nSSL [13] & OpenCA [12])
and a TPM, allowing enterprises to set-up a hardware secure CA by simply booting a CD.
The TPM is used in that project to enforce the following features of the CA’s long-lived
private key:
• ensuring that it is only used for authorized operations.
• guaranteeing that it cannot be compromised by an adversary.
The TPM is used to hold the CA’s private key3, as well as to add assurance that the key
would only be used when the system was correctly configured asthe CA – by wrapping
the private key to specified values in a specified subset of thePCRs. The TPM would then
decrypt and use (i.e., not release to the outside) that key only when those PCRs have those
values.
However, as described earlier, current TCG/TPM implementations suffer from the TOC-
TOU limitation. Therefore, at run-time, there should be a way of detecting compromise to
the platform configuration and thus preventing the CA from using its private key.
We will use this example as the motivating problem for addressing the TOCTOU issues
within the TCG architecture.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter2 briefly describes the build blocks needed for
our prototype. Chapter3 gives a detailed explanation of the design and implementation
of our prototype system. Chapter4 describes software-based TOCTOU attacks on TPM
measured memory, and ways to detect them using our prototypesyst m. We also show
how to apply our prototype to verify the integrity of data associated with an application,
3We assume that the CA’s private key is implemented as a RSA credential, that is used only within the
TPM and is protected by it.
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and ways to tie data with the process that owns it. Chapter5 discusses some areas for
possible future work. Chapter6 examines related work. Finally, Chapter7 presents a




This chapter gives a brief summary of the building blocks of our prototype.
2.1 The TPM
TPMs have shielded locations calledPlatform Configuration Registers(PCR) , each 160-
bits long, that hold a digest of integrity measurements. ThePM has to provide at least 16
PCRs in TCG 1.1b [21] and 24 PCRs in TCG 1.2 [20] inside its protected memory.
The contents of a PCR can only beextended, and can only be reset by a reboot1. Ex-
tending a PCR implies that when a new value is to be stored in a particular PCR, it is
concatenated with the previously stored PCR value, and a hash of the combined value is
taken. The syntax of the operation is:
Extend(PCR[i], new value): PCR[i] = SHA1(PCR[i], new value)
While this allows a large number of values to be measured and stored without simply
overwriting previous measurements, it also prevents malicious users from substituting a
known good value for one that indicates tampering.
1This concerns only PCR[0-15]. PCR[17-20] (as provided in TCG 1.2) can be reset anytime by Locality
4. “Locality” is a concept that allows the TPM to be aware of which trusted process on the platform is sending
it commands. There are six Localities defined (numbers 0 to 4 and Legacy).
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Figure 2.1:Generic Architecture Diagram of the TCG Authenticated BootProcess.
2.1.1 Attestation
On system start-up, a hardware component, called theCor Root of Trust Measurement2
(CRTM), hashes the BIOS and other firmware related configuration files and extends the
result into a specific PCR on the TPM. The BIOS proceeds to hashthe next piece of soft-
ware that is executed, which is usually the boot-loader contained in theMaster Boot Record
(MBR) of the system, and extends the result into a specific PCRon the TPM. If the boot-
loader is TCG-enabled (e.g., Trusted-Grub [2]) it will continue the chain of trust by extend-
ing the hash value of the software it loads (e.g., the operating system) into another PCR.
This chain of hash values stored in the PCRs is called theplatform configuration. The TPM
can sign this platform configuration using a protected key, to attest it to a remote challenger.
The TCG authenticated boot process is shown in Figure2.1.
2.1.2 Sealing and Wrapping
To ensure that certain sensitive data on a platform can only be accessed under a specific
platform configuration, a sealing mechanism is provided. The platform configuration is
defined by the set (or subset) of values contained in the PCRs.Sensitive data is encrypted
2This is usually the BIOS boot block, as it is the first piece of cde that executes on system start-up.
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using a public key3 and cannot be decrypted unless the system is in the same platform
configuration as it were at the time of sealing.
The TPM can also be used to create RSA key pairs (a public key and a private key),
where the usage of the private key is bound to a platform configuration. More specifically,
such key pairs, calledwrappedkeys, have their private key encrypted by a specified parent
key, and are bound to a set of values in a specified subset of thePCRs. The PCR subset is
specified at key pair creation time. The TPM will decrypt and use (i.e., not release to the
outside) the private key, only if those subset of PCRs have the same values as were present
at key pair creation time.
Essentially, secrets are accessible only when the platformis in a defined configuration.
Figure 2.2:TPM Wrapped Key
3The corresponding private key is stored encrypted within the TPM.
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2.2 x86 Memory Management
Our prototype is implemented on the Intel x86 architecture.W chose this because it is the
most popular processor architecture in use today. This section recaps features of the x86
virtual memory architecture that are relevant to understanding the working of our prototype.
Page Tables(PT) are data structures used by the virtual memory subsystem to store
mappings between virtual memory addresses and physical addresses. When an instruction
attempts to access a virtual memory address, the hardware (MMU) converts that virtual
address to a physical address by walking the page tables, andthe accesses the physical
memory.
Linux on the x86 architecture usually uses a two-level page tble structure for virtual
address translation, as shown in Figure2.3. The first level table is called aPage Global
Directory (PGD) . The x86’sCR3 privileged register holds the physical base address of the
currently active process’s PGD. The PGD points to second-level PT pages.
With 32-bit virtual addresses, the most significant 10 bits (bit 31 to bit 22) of the address
are used as an index into the PGD. The PGD is the size of a page, i.e. 4 Kilobytes, and
has210 entries, each of which is 4 bytes long. Each entry in the PGD contains the physical
address of the base of a second-level PT page.
The next 10 bits (bit 21 to bit 12) of the virtual address determine an index into the
PT page. The PT page is also the size of a page. The PT page has210 entries, each of
which is 4 bytes. The most significant 20 bits of aP ge Table Entry(PTE) contain the most
significant bits of the physical address of a frame in RAM, while the other 12 bits are used
as permission and status bits.
The last 12 bits (bit 11 to bit 0) of the virtual address are used as an offset within the
physical frame.
9
Figure 2.3:Two-level x86 Page Table structure.
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2.3 The Xen Hypervisor
Xen [22] is a free and open-source VMM (also called a hypervisor) forx86 that allows
for the simultaneous execution of multiple guest operatingsystems on the same physical
hardware. It provides features like secure isolation, resource control, quality-of-service
guarantees, and live migration of virtual machines [3]. Operating systems need to be ex-
plicitly ported/modified to run on Xen, although compatibility is maintained for user-level
applications and libraries. The latest IntelVanderpol Technology(VT) [8] and AMD Paci-
fica [1] processors support hardware-assisted virtualization, which allow Xen to execute
unmodified operating system binaries.
The components of a Xen-enabled system, as sketched in Figure 2.4, include the Xen
hypervisor (Ring4 0), a privileged domain5 (Ring 1), multiple unprivileged domains (Ring
1) and some user-level control and management tools (Ring 3). The privileged domain is
commonly referred to asDomain-0, and the unprivileged domains asDomain-U. Control
software running in the privileged domain has access to a control i terface running in the
hypervisor that can be used to create, suspend, migrate and trminate unprivileged domains.
Xen replaces the interrupts mechanism from devices with an asy chronous event mech-
anism. CPU resources are dynamically distributed among domains. To provide strong
isolation, main memory is statically partitioned between domains by specifying the initial
memory allocation for each domain at the time of their creation. The hypervisor is re-
sponsible for managing its own memory as well as that of the domains it hosts. Memory
management in Xen is further discussed in Section2.3.3.
4In x86 architecture, there are four privilege levels, called rings, numbered from 0 to 3, with 0 being the
most privileged.
5“Domain” is Xen terminology for a virtual machine.
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Figure 2.4:Standard layout for a Xen-enabled system hosting a privileged domain (Domain-0) and
an unprivileged domain (Domain-U).
2.3.1 Paravirtualization
Xen’s high performance virtualization is achieved by employing a technique calledparavir-
tualization. Paravirtualization requires operating systems to be aware that they are running
in a virtual machine. This virtualization technique present a software interface to virtual
machines, that is similar, but not exactly alike, to that of the underlying hardware. This
requires explicit porting of the operating systems to be able to run atop the VMM. The
porting essentially entails replacing the guest OS’s privileged instructions with appropriate
calls (hypercalls, Section2.3.2) to the VMM.
The hypervisor also maintains avirtual CPU for each domain. When a guest OS would
like to write to a protected register (which is disallowed since it takes a privileged instruc-




Domains communicate with Xen using software interrupts called hypercalls. Hypercalls
are calls from Ring 1 to Ring 0 that allow Guest OSes to requestX n to perform operations
on their behalf. This is done in a manner similar to how systemcalls, from Ring 3 to Ring
0, allow applications to invoke privileged operations in a traditional OS.
On x86/32 machines the instruction required isINT 0x82. Currently there are about
thirty five hypercalls. We have added three additional hypercalls for our prototype.
2.3.3 Memory Management
Memory management is one of the more important aspects of Xen. As the same physical
memory is used by multiple domains, caution has to be taken topreserve isolation and
security. Unprivileged domains should be restricted from accessing each other’s memory.
Guest OSes are responsible for allocating and managing their own hardware page tables,
which have to be registered with Xen. Guest OSes are limited to read-only access to their
page tables, i.e. they are disallowed from creating writable mappings to frames containing
active page tables. Each page table update is intercepted and validated by the hypervisor
to ensure that domains only manipulate their own page tables. Domains may batch these
operations to make sequential updates more efficient.
Domains are allocated physical memory at creation time by the hypervisor. The mem-
ory is not necessarily a contiguous chunk in the physical RAM. However, as most operating
systems are not equipped to operate in a fragmented6 physical address space, Xen intro-
duces a new type of memory, referred to aspseudo-physicalmemory, which is distinct from
machinememory. Machine memory refers to the physical memory (RAM) installed in the
machine, while pseudo-physical memory is a per-VM abstraction, providing a guest OS
6 In most operating systems physical addresses of kernel symbols, given its linear address, are calculated
by subtracting a constant offset. For example, for the LinuxKernel the offset is 0xC0000000.
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with the illusion that its memory is a contiguous range of physical pages. The translation
between these two addresses is not transparent, and guest OSs need to do this translation
for themselves. Xen maintains globally readable tables that provide the mapping between
machine and pseudo-physical memory addresses and vice versa.
Xen Page Tables
To make PT updates by the guest OS visible to the hypervisor, all of the pages that are
currently part of a PT are mapped read-only in the guest. Guest OSes are only allowed
read access to their PTs, with all updates being performed bythe hypervisor. Xen currently
offers three PT update modes to the guests that it hosts:
Hypercall Mode In this mode, guest OSes have to explicitly make hypercalls (mmu update)
to update their PTs. The hypervisor validates the updates being r quested. If none of the
memory constraints are violated, the PT is updated.
Writable Page Table Mode In this mode, guest OSes are led to believe that their PTEs
are directly writable. Guest attempts to write to their PTEscause a page fault (because the
PTs are mapped read-only), which is trapped and emulated by the hypervisor. If none of
the memory constraints are violated, the PT is updated.
Shadow Page Table Mode This mode is mainly used by the guest OS when live migra-
tion is being performed. In this mode, there are two sets of PTs; the guest OS sees a set of
PTs, that are distinct from the ones seen by the hypervisor. The hypervisor sees the actual
hardware page tables (pointed to by theCR3 register). The hypervisor is responsible for
propagating changes made to the guest’s PTs to the real ones,and vice versa.
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2.3.4 Event Channels
The hypervisor controls access to physical devices to ensuri olation, dependability and
efficient usage. Access is managed using an event mechanism.
Interrupts are handled within the hypervisor. On receivinga interrupt, the hypervisor
issues to the corresponding Domain an asynchronous event noticati n. Notications are
delivered to Domains through event channels. The hypervisor communicates these events
with a Domain through a shared memory page.
Domain-0 has direct access all the system hardware. A driverus d by Domain-0 to
provide access to a virtual device to other domains is calledbackend device driver, while
a driver that a domain uses to control a virtual driver is called afrontend device driver. This
set-up is shown in Figure2.5.
A Domain has a set of event channel connection points, calledports, which connect
to one end of a channel. The opposite end of the channel connects to either aphysical
Interrupt Request(IRQ) , avirtual IRQor a port in an alternate Domain. A physical IRQ is
synonymous with the native IRQ of a device, while a virtual IRQ refers to an IRQ managed
by the hypervisor. This mechanism allows an event generatedby a backend driver to be
delivered to the frontend driver as a virtual IRQ.
We created a new Xen virtual IRQ for our prototype to notify Domain-0 of tampering
with trusted memory.
2.4 Virtual TPMs
For our prototype we will be using the unprivileged Domain-1as our test system. Unpriv-
ileged VMs cannot access the system’s hardware TPM, and so, to provide Domain-1 with
TPM access, we need to make use of virtual TPMs.
In a virtual machine-based environment,Virtual TPM (vTPM) [4] support provides
15
TPM functionality to the different virtual machines running on the platform. vTPM sup-
port has to be explicitly requested for by the VMs, by having it specified in their creation
configuration files. The vTPM interface gives each domain theimpression that it is access-
ing its own exclusive TPM, as if it were a hardware TPM.
The vTPM interface is implemented using a split device driver architecture, as shown
in Figure 2.5. The virtual device is provided using two collaborating drive s (as dis-
cussed earlier): the frontend device driver, which runs in an unprivileged user Domain
(Domain-U), and the backend device driver, which runs in a privileged domain with access
to the real device hardware (currently Domain 0). The frontend xports a character device
/dev/tpm0 to user-level applications for communicating with the vTPM. This is consis-
tent with the interface provided if a hardware TPM is available on the system. The backend
provides a single interface/dev/vtpm where the vTPM has threads waiting for requests
from the different domains that have a corresponding frontend.
The frontend driver receives IO requests from its kernel andforwards these onto the
backend. The backend receives these IO requests, and is responsible for verifying that they
are safe and do not violate isolation guarantees. It then issues these requests to the actual
hardware TPM. On IO completion, the backend notifies the frontend, which correspond-
ingly reports IO completion to its own kernel.
The vTPM implementation exists as a user-level process in Domain0. The vTPM man-
ager (vtpm managerd) is used for the creation, deletion, suspension and migration of
vTPM instances. It is also responsible for multiplexing requ sts from the different VMs to
their respective vTPM instances. TPM commands are delivered from a Domain-U to the
vTPM manager, which dispatches it to a software TPM. The software TPM provides TPM
functionality to virtual machines.
In order to distinguish which VM the TPM command was issued from, a 4-byte vTPM
instance number is concatenated to the beginning of each TPMcommand packet by the
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backend device driver. The instance number pinpoints whichunique vTPM instance a VM
can interface with.




In this chapter, we discuss the major design choices behind ts implementation. We will
also explore the actual execution of this prototype.
3.1 Reasons for using Xen
The reasons for using a virtual machine-based system, such aXen, to explore and test our
ideas with respect to the TOCTOU issues with the TCG architectur are as follows:
• Xen is being used in this project not for its virtualization features, but as a layer
that runs directly below the operating system – similar to the placement of the hard-
ware layer in a non-virtualized environment. Its placementhelps us study possible
hardware features.
• In a Xen based system, all memory updates trap into the thin hypervisor layer –
making it easy to monitor and keep tabs on changing memory.
• Redesigning the MMU hardware is tricky, so we do not want to atempt that until we
were certain that the end goal was useful.
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• A potentially better alternative to using Xen would have been to use an open-source
x86 emulator (such as Bochs [5] or QEMU [14]). However, as of their current im-
plementation, none of these emulators have support for emulating a TPM. Also, the
only currently existing software-based TPM emulator [18] does not integrate with
any of these. Integrating them would be a major task in itself.
• In the long run, Xen might prove to be an end in itself and we might be able to just
use Xen, rather than modifying the MMU, even for real deployment.
3.2 Role of Xen
We could have used Xen in our implementation to address the TCG/ PM TOCTOU limi-
tation via two different approaches, as explained below. Wechoose to go with the first of
these.
3.2.1 Transparent layer
The strategic placement of the thin Xen hypervisor layer betwe n the machine’s hardware
and the operating system could be seen as a way to prototype changes that could be made
in hardware (i.e. in the MMU).
With this approach, the purpose of Xen would be to solely demonstrate a proposed
hardware change, and would not be intended to be integrated into theTCG Software Stack1
(TSS) .
Xen’s role would be that of a “transparent” layer, manifesting features that would ide-
ally be present in hardware.
1The TCG Software Stack is the software supporting the platform’s TPM.
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Figure 3.1:Extending the Authenticated Boot Process into the virtualized environment.
3.2.2 Part of the TSS
Alternatively, Xen could be used with the purpose of incorporating it into the TSS. The
trusted boot sequence would now include the measurement of the Xen hypervisor exe-
cutable, the Domain-0 Kernel and applications running in Domain-0, subsequent to the
system being booted by a trusted boot-loader. The advantageof this model is that our
Trusted Computing Base(TCB) will be extended all the way up to the hosting virtual ma-
chine environment.
The TCG trust management architecture is currently defined only up to the bootstrap
loader, for this implementation we will need to extend the chain of trust up to applications
running in Domain-0, as shown in Figure3.1.
However, as the hypervisor layer is not currently part of theTCG trust management
architecture, incorporating it into the TSS will necessitate revision of the TCG specifica-
tion.
3.3 TPM Status
Employing Xen to monitor measured memory and update the TPM when that measured
memory is altered could have two possible implications on the TPM’s status, as explained
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below. We choose to go with the second implementation.
3.3.1 Dynamic TPM
The idea here is to update the TPM’s state every time the measured memory of an ap-
plication is changed. At all times then, the TPM’s state willreflect the current memory
configuration of a particular application, and of the systemas a whole. This would allow a
remote verifier to be aware of the current state of the application in memory, and to make
trust judgments based on these presently stored PCR values.
When the hypervisor detects a write to the monitored area of an application’s memory, it
would invoke a re-measurement of the application in memory.The re-measurement would
involve, calculating a SHA1 hash of the critical area of the binary in memory (as opposed
to the initial measurement stored in the PCR, which was of thebinary image on disk). This
remeasured value would be extended to the TPM.
In this case, monitoring of memory writes would be enabled for the entire lifetime of
an application, as the TPM state would need to be updated eachtime the application’s
measured memory changed.
3.3.2 Static (Tamper-indicating) TPM
The idea here is, to update the TPM’s state only the first time that the measured memory of
an application is changed. This would allow a remote verifierto easily recognize that the
state of the application in memory has changed, and hence detect tampering.
When the hypervisor detects the first write to a critical areaof n application’s memory,
it would not invoke a re-measurement of the application; instead, wouldmerely extend the
TPM with a random value.
In this case, monitoring of memory writes could be turned offafter the first update to
the TPM, as that update would be sufficient to indicate tampering. Monitoring subsequent
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writes (tampering) will not provide any further benefit. This strategy will not have as much
of a negative impact on performance as the first approach.
3.4 Implementation Outline
The prototype implementation consists of three primary comp nents: the instrumented
Linux Kernel for reporting, the modified Xen hypervisor for monitoring, and the invalida-
tion in the TPM.
The steps below are carried out after the application is measur d and extended into the
vTPM of the Domain under test.
3.4.1 Reporting
The paravirtualized Kernel of the Domain under test (in our prototype – Domain-1), has
been instrumented to allow it to report to the hypervisor – the PTEs, and physical frames
that these PTEs map to, of the memory to be monitored, as shownin Figure3.2
To enable this feature, two new hypercalls have been added tothe Xen hypervisor:
• HYPERVISOR report ptes reports to the hypervisor a list of PTEs that map the
memory that needs to be monitored. The PTEs are essentially the entries that map
the.text section of the binary into memory.
• HYPERVISOR report frames reports to the hypervisor a list of physical mem-
ory addresses that need to be monitored. The addresses are the physical base ad-
dresses of each frame that contain memory that needs to be monitored.
These hypercalls make use of a new function that we have addedto the Kernel:
• virt to phys() walks a process’s page tables in software to translate virtual ad-
dresses to physical addresses. We pass to this function the start and end virtual ad-
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Figure 3.2:Reporting to the hypervisor the PTEs and frames to be monitored.
dresses of the.text section of the binary to be monitored. Using the fact that
there are 4096 bytes of data on each page2, it calculates the number of virtual pages
spanned by the address range passed to it. It then accesses anaddress on each page
of the range, so as to have it mapped into memory. This step is required to overcome
potential problems due todemand loading.3 At this point, the whole of the.text
section of the binary is mapped into memory. This step however, has performance
implications in that it slows down application start-up, asshown in Section4.4. The
function then walks the page tables of the process to translate the virtual addresses
to physical addresses (physical base address) of each framein th range. A data
structure containing a list of these addresses is returned to the calling function.
Also, on program exit (normal or abnormal), we need to have the monitored PTES
and frame addresses removed from the monitored list. This requirement is fulfilled by
2Our experimental system has a 4Kb page size.
3Demand loading is a lazy loading technique, where only accessed pages are loaded into memory.
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instrumenting the Kernel’sdo exit function to invoke a new hypercall:
• HYPERVISOR report exit reports to the hypervisor when an application that is
being monitored exits. The hypervisor’s monitoring code thn deletes the relevant
entries from its monitored lists.
3.4.2 Monitoring
Once the required PTEs and frame addresses are passed down toXen, it will monitor them
to detect any modifications made to them, as shown in Figure3.3.
Figure 3.3:Monitoring the reported PTEs and frames for updation.
Writes to these physical memory addresses, or updates to these PTEs to make them
map to a different subset of memory pages or make them into writable mappings, will be
treated as tampering. The reason for this is that since we aremonitoring the read-only code
section of an application, neither of the above updates are legitimately required.
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The most convenient and reliable method of detecting these types of updates is to ‘hook’
into Xen’s page table updation code. As mentioned earlier, all page table updates in a Xen
system go through the hypervisor. This enables us to put in code that can track specific
addresses and PTEs.
The default mode of page table updates on our experimental setup is the Writable Page
Table mode, as described in Section2.3.3. In this mode, writes to page table pages are
trapped and emulated by the hypervisor, using theptwr emulated update() func-
tion.
Amongst other parameters, this function receives the address of the PTE that needs to
be updated and the new value to be written into it. After doinga few sanity checks, it
invokes Xen’supdate l1e() function to do the actual update.
update l1e() is the function that we instrument to detect tampering. Amongst other
parameters, this function receives the old PTE value and thenew PTE value that it needs to
be updated to. To detect tampering, we perform the followingchecks:
• For PTEs: we check to see if theold PTE value passed in is part of our monitored
list. If it is, it means that a ‘trusted PTE’ is being updated to either point to a different
set of frames, or to make it writable. The alternate set of frames are considered as
potentially malicious frames, and the updated writable permission leaves the corre-
sponding trusted memory open for overwriting with malicious code. This scenario is
described in more detail in Section4.1.2and Section4.1.3.
• For frames: We first check to see if thenewPTE value passed in has its writable bit
set. If it does, we calculate the physical address of the frame it points to. We then
inspect if this physical address is part of our monitored list. If it is, it means that a
‘trusted frame’ is being mapped writable by this new PTE. Thewritable mapping,
created by this new PTE is interpreted as a means to overwritethe ‘trusted frame’
with potentially malicious code. This scenario is described in more detail in Sec-
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tion 4.1.1.
Once the tampering is detected in the hypervisor layer, we need to be able to indicate
this fact to Domain-0. We do this by creating a new virtual interrupt,VIRQ TAMPER,
that a guest OS may receive from Xen.VIRQ TAMPER, is a global virtualInterrupt Re-
quest(IRQ) , that can be allocated once per guest, and is used in ourpr totype to indicate
tampering with trusted memory.
3.4.3 Invalidating
Once tampering of trusted memory is detected in the hypervisor layer, the Domain under
test needs to have its integrity measurements updated. Thisis done by way of updating the
Domain’s platform configuration in its virtual TPM, as shownin Figure3.4.
Figure 3.4:Updating PCR in vTPM of Domain-1 on tamper detection.
Our intention is to have the hardware (MMU) do this update. Considering that, in our
prototype, the hypervisor together with Domain-0 are playing the role of the hardware, we
26
need to have either of them perform this updation. However, as there are no device drivers
present in the hypervisor layer, the hypervisor is unable tointerface with the virtual TPM
of Domain-1, and so this task is redirected to the privilegedDomain-0.
The hypervisor will indicate tampering to Domain-0 by sending a specific virtual inter-
rupt (VIRQ TAMPER) to it. A Linux Kernel Module in Domain-0 will receive this inter-
rupt, and will proceed to extend the concerned PCR in the virtual TPM of Domain-1 with
a random value.
We have to make use of the virtual TPM Manager (vtpm managerd) to talk to the
virtual TPM of Domain-1. In its current implementation, thevirtual TPM manager only
delivers TPM commands from unprivileged Domains to the software TPM. Domain-0 is
not allowed4 to directly interface with the software TPM. However, for our prototype, we
need Domain-0 to have this ability, and so we have to mislead the virtual TPM Manager into
thinking that the TPM commands from Domain-0 are actually originating from Domain-1.
In Domain-0, we construct the required TPM I/O buffers and command sequences re-
quired for aTPM Extend to a PCR of Domain-1. As described in Section2.4, there
is a unique instance number associated with each vTPM. To enable Domain-0 to access
the vTPM instance of Domain-1, we prepend the above TPM command p ckets with the
instance number associated with Domain-1. This effectively h lp us forge packets from
Domain-1.
4Domain-0 is only allowed to access the actual hardware TPM orthe software TPM, but not the vTPM




Our prototype on x86, runs on a Xen 3.0.3 virtual machine-based system. Xen’s privileged
and unprivileged domains run Linux Kernel 2.6.16.29. Our evaluation hardware consists of
a 2 GHz Pentium processor with 1.5 GB of RAM. Virtual machinesw re allocated 128 MB
of RAM in this environment. Our machine has an Atmel TPM 1.2 security chip.
4.1 Security Evaluation
In this section, we describe some software-based attacks oncurrent TCG/TPM architecture,
and show how our prototype successfully detects all of theseattacks. We present three
attack scenarios that we implemented, which can be used to subvert measured memory by
exploiting the previously mentioned TOCTOU vulnerability.
These attacks, seek to change the.text1 section of a loaded binary. The.text
section is mapped read-only into memory, and so, is conventionally considered safe from
tampering. However, with sufficient (root) privileges, an attacker can employ methods to
modify the code stored in it by remapping or overwriting it.
The attacking process for all three attacks could be owned bythe attacker, or could be
1The.text section holds the complied code of a program
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an arbitrary process. In our scenarios, the attacker takes the form of a kernel module that is
inserted into the kernel.
For these attacks the victim process we attacked isnot the CA. To make things plausible
we decided to attack smaller test programs. Nonetheless, the results we obtained would
theoretically be the same if the victim process was the CA.
4.1.1 Attack and Defense 1
This attack scenario involves an attacker overwriting the trusted code of a victim process
by creating writable page mappings to the victim process’s tru ted frames from another
process, as shown in Figure4.1.
We carried out this attack by modifying2 a PTE in our malicious process to map to a
physical frame in RAM that the victim process’s trusted codewas currently mapped to.
We modified the PTE to hold the frame address of the victim process page that we wanted
to overwrite. The PTE that we chose to update already had its wr able bit set, so we did
not need to update the permission bits. Using this illegitima e mapping we were able to
overwrite a part of the trusted frame with arbitrary data.
It is interesting to note that this attack was possible withou having to tamper with any
of the victim process’s data structures.
The above update to the malicious process’s PTs goes throughthe ypervisor and in
effect through our monitoring code. The monitoring code detects that a writable mapping
is being created to a subset of the physical frames that it is monitoring. It evaluates this as
being a tampering attempt, and raises an alarm.
In the case of the CA, the attacker could overwrite its trusted m mory to gain unautho-
rized use of its private key, such as to sign bogus certificates.
2The attack could also be carried out by creating a new PTE thatmaps to the victim process’s frames
29
Figure 4.1:Attacker manipulates PTE(s) of his process to map to trustedframes of victim process.
Overwrites memory in RAM.
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4.1.2 Attack and Defense 2
This attack scenario requires an attacker to modify the trusted code of a victim process by
updating the mappings of its.text section to point to rogue frames in RAM, as shown
in Figure4.2.
We carried out this attack by using our malicious process to update the address portion
of a PTE in the victim process that was mapping its code section. The updated address in
the PTE mapped to rogue physical frames in RAM that were part of our malicious process.
Due to these updated mappings, the victim process’s trustedcode was now substituted with
the content of our rogue frame.
The above update to the victim process’s PTs goes through thehypervisor and in effect
through our monitoring code. The monitoring code detects that a subset of its monitored
PTEs are being updated to point to different portions of RAM.It evaluates this as being a
tampering attempt, and raises an alarm.
In the case of the CA, the attacker could modify its trusted memory to point to rogue
frames, which allowed for unauthorized use of its private key, such as to sign bogus certifi-
cates.
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Figure 4.2:Attacker manipulates PTE (address portion) of victim process to map to rogue frames
in RAM.
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4.1.3 Attack and Defense 3
This attack scenario entails an attacker overwriting the trusted code of a victim process
by updating the permission bits of its.text section to make them writable, as shown
in Figure4.3.
We carried out this attack by using our malicious process to update the permission
bits of a PTE in the victim process that was mapping its code section. We updated the
permission bits to set the writable bit making the corresponding mapped frame writable. We
used this writable mapping to modify the trusted code in the victim process with arbitrary
data.
The above update to the victim process’s PTs goes through thehypervisor and in effect
through our monitoring code. The monitoring code detects that a subset of its monitored
PTEs are being updated to make them writable It evaluates this as being a tampering at-
tempt, and raises an alarm.
In the case of the CA, the attacker could overwrite its trusted m mory to gain unautho-
rized use of its private key, such as to sign bogus certificates.
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Figure 4.3:Attacker manipulates PTE (permission bits) of victim process to make frames writable.
Overwrites memory in RAM.
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Current Prototype
TPM Implementation TPM Implementation
Attack 1 undetected allows for unauthorized detected, reported & no unauthorized use
use of CA’s private key TPM state updated of CA’s private key
Attack 2 undetected allows for unauthorized detected, reported & no unauthorized use
use of CA’s private key TPM state updated of CA’s private key
Attack 3 undetected allows for unauthorized detected, reported & no unauthorized use
use of CA’s private key TPM state updated of CA’s private key
Table 4.1:Comparison of TPM implementations
4.2 Protecting Data and Secrets
As described in Section2.1.2, the TPM can be used to generate RSA key-pairs, where
the usage of the private key is bound to a particular platformconfiguration. The platform
configuration is defined by the set (or subset) of values contained in the PCRs.
We can use this feature of the TPM to verify the integrity of data, such as a configuration
file, associated with an application. Using the CA as an example we want to ensure that
the CA will use its private key only when it is running the legitimate CA binary, as well
as is correctly configured to be the CA. The initial settings of the CA are setup using a
configuration file. Therefore, at CA start-up, it is essential to ensure that we are reading the
correct untampered CA configuration file.
To achieve this, in an initial test run, we do both – hash the CAbinary, as well as the
CA configuration file, and extend both to specific distinct PCRs. We then generate the CA’s
signing key pair, as a wrapped key pair that is bound to the twoaforementioned PCRs.
In production run, when we start-up the CA, we do the same, i.e., have its binary and
configuration file extended to the same specific PCRs as before.
Note:If the production run is performed after a system reboot of the test run, the PCRs
would have automatically beenzeroized, and we don’t need to do anything special. If,
however, the production run is being performed without a system reboot of the test run,
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we have to ensure that the CA specific PCRs3 are zeroized using theTPM PCR Reset
command.
When the CA’s encrypted private key is requested to be used for signing, it will only be
able to be decrypted and used within the TPM if the following conditions hold:
• The PCR containing the hash of the binary is unchanged.
• The PCR containing the hash of the configuration file is as expected.
These checks guarantee two things. First, the CA process image in memory has not
been tampered with since start-up. If it had, our prototype would have detected the tam-
pering and updated the PCR. Second, the CA was started-up with the correct configuration
file, and so, is set-up and running as expected.
To prove our hypothesis, we tested out the above ideas using small test programs and
found them to be safe and effective.
In a similar vein, we can use the TPM sealing functionality toall w an application to
encrypt data, and ensure that the data will only be decryptedwhen the application is set-up
and running as expected.
4.3 Binding Secrets and Data to Processes
In their current specification and implementation, the sealing/wrapping and signing facil-
ities do not bind secrets and data to their ‘owner’ process. By ‘owner’ we refer to the
application that either encrypted/signed a piece of data orgenerated a key.
This lack of binding could have security implications. Any running application on the
system could potentially unseal the data or unwrap the key, and use it for unauthorized
purposes. The TCG specification does have a provision to guard against this – specifying
3In this case, the CA specific PCRs chosen will have to be a subset of the resettable PCRs.
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a password4 that will be checked against at the time of unsealing or unwrapping, in con-
junction with checking the value in the PCRs. However, if no password is specified, or if it
is easily guessable, it leaves open the possibility for unauthorized use.
One way of resolving this problem would be to have a dedicatedresettable PCR on
the TPM that would be extended with the hash of the binary of the currently executing
process on the system. This PCR would be included in the set ofPCRs that are used for
sealing/wrapping against. As a consequence, the ‘owner‘ process would be required to be
currently active on the processor for unsealing/unwrapping to be successful. Every time
there is a context-switch (indicated by a change of value in theCR3 register), the above-
mentioned PCR would first be reset, and then be extended with the relevant hash value.
This mechanism would prevent a process that is not the ‘owner’ of a particular sensitive
artifact from accessing it.
On systems where the context switching rate is high, having the reset and extend TPM
commands carried out on every context switch, might be infeasible and inefficient. We
suggest and implement a more feasible resolution to this problem. Note, however, that this
will work only for a ‘session’, i.e., if the application is not re-started. This steps are as
follows:
• We implemented newCreate Key andSeal commands as part of the TSS that
include the currentCR3 register value as part of the binding information, along with
the specified PCRs. This would cause the sealed/wrapped datato be associated with
the currently active process, and help establish an ‘owner’.
• Similarly, we implemented newUnseal andSign commands that compare the
previously storedCR3 register value against the current value, as well as checks
against the PCR values. If they match, it implies that it is the ‘owner’ of the data that
4The password is stored in a wrappedKey data structure associted with the corresponding asymmetric
key.
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is trying to access it. Hence, the unsealing/signing would be allowed, else it would
be disallowed.
4.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our prototype system. We measure the
additional overhead incurred by our system vs. a native XEN/vTPM system. The results
show that our prototype offers enhanced security features with a minimal performance
overhead.
Table4.2shows the overhead incurred in the Linux Kernel for reporting rusted PTEs/frames
to the hypervisor. As can be seen for the first run the overheadis much greater than for sub-
sequent runs. The reason being that for the first run none of the pages of the code section
have been mapped into memory as yet. For subsequent runs, if the pages have not been
swapped out reporting is much faster. On the average, for thefirst run it takes between
8-14 microseconds for the reporting of a PTE-frame pair fromthe Guest OS to the hyper-
visor.
Binary Size of Number of PTEs/FramesOverhead on Average overhead on
Name Binary (Kb) to monitor first run (µs) subsequent runs (µs)
openssl 392 93 774 23
perl 1036 248 3558 687
aptitude 2248 559 7963 1977
gdb 2312 609 8501 2219
Table 4.2:Reporting Overhead
Table4.3shows the overhead incurred in the hypervisor for monitoring trusted PTEs/frames
passed to it from the Guest OS. We performed two sets of calculations. The first shows
the overhead incurred on loading a binary when the hypervisor’s monitored list is empty.
The other shows the overhead incurred on loading a binary when t re are a thousand
PTEs/frames being monitored.
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Binary Size of Overhead when monitoredOverhead when 1000 PTEs/Frames
Name Binary (Kb) list is empty (µs) are being monitored (µs)
openssl 392 289 2799
perl 1036 680 3164
aptitude 2248 1462 3952
gdb 2312 1588 4072
Table 4.3:Monitoring Overhead
These results show that the overhead of our prototype systemi al ost negligible, mak-
ing it a very usable and deployable.
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Chapter 5
Discussion and Future Work
In this chapter, several issues that deserve more careful discussion and consideration are
listed. We also point out potential avenues for further research. Implementation of these
ideas will help make this prototype more complete and robust.
Protection: We only protect against physical memory accesses that are resolved by travers-
ing the page tables maintained by the MMU.Direct Memory Access(DMA) allows certain
hardware subsystems to access system memory independentlyof the CPU will not be pro-
tected against.
Paging to Disk: Pages can be swapped in and out of physical memory and onto thedisk.
If a page gets swapped out, its present bit will be cleared. Onbei g read back from disk,
this page may be allocated into a different frame than it was previously stored in. If a page
mapped by a subset of the physical addresses that we are monitoring, gets swapped out,
we need to remove those addresses from our monitored list, and update it with a new set of
addresses when the page gets swapped in again. Also, when a page gets swapped out, its
PTE is updated to record the disk location (swap space) at which t e content of the page
can be found. We will need to make note of this address, to check that the page that gets
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swapped back in is the same that was swapped out.
In our initial prototype, we have not implemented any functionality related to swapping,
and leave this as future work.
Context Switches: Since we are monitoring physical addresses, which remain unique
across context switches between applications (or virtual machines), no special processing
is required for this case.
Memory to Monitor: Ideally, besides critical code, it would be beneficial to monit r
static read-only data and memory at which important kernel ad application data structures,
such as interrupt descriptor tables, system call tables andfunction pointer tables (Global
Offset Table(GOT) andProcedure Linkage Table(PLT) ) are stored.
Dynamic TPM: Implementing the dynamic TPM, as described in Section3.3.1, would
be a radical step forward in the way TPMs currently operate. It would enable the TPM to






IBM designed and implemented a TPM-basedIntegrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)
to measure the integrity of a Linux system. Their implementation [15] was able to extend
the TCG trust measurement architecture from the BIOS all theway up into the application
layer.
Integrity measurements are taken as soon as executable content is loaded into the sys-
tem, but before it is executed. An ordered list of measurements is maintained within the
kernel, and the TPM is used to protect the integrity of this list. Remote parties can verify
what software stack is loaded by viewing the list, and using the TPM state to ensure that
the list has not been tampered with.
6.2 Bear/Enforcer
The Bear/Enforcer [11, 10] project from Dartmouth College developed aLinux Security
Module(LSM) to help improve integrity of a Linux system.
The Enforcer is a Linux Security Module that calculates the hash of each protected file
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as it is opened, and compares it to a previously stored value.If a file is found to be modified,
Enforcer does some combination of the following: denies access to the file, writes an entry
in the system log, panics the system or locks the TCG hardware.
6.3 Copilot
Copilot [9] is a run-time kernel integrity monitor, that uses a separate bus-mastering PCI
add-in card to make checks on system memory.
The Copilot monitor, routinely recomputes hashes of the kernel’s text, modules, and
other critical data structures, and compares them against known good values to detect for
any corruption.
6.4 Pioneer
Pioneer [16] provides software-based run-time code attestation.
A trusted entity known as theverifier can verify the software stack running on an un-
trusted platform, by sending a challenge to a self-checkingverification function on that
platform. The check-sum, returned as the response to the verifier, is checked for correct-
ness as well as if it is returned within the expected time or not. If an adversary tries to ma-
nipulate the check-sum computation, the computation time will noticeably increase. This
helps the verifier determine if a dynamic root of trust existson the untrusted platform. The




BIND [17] is a service that performs fine-grained attestation for establishing a trusted en-
vironment for distributed systems.
Rather than attesting to the entire contents of memory, BINDattests only to a critical
piece of code, that is about to execute. It narrows the gap between time-of-attestation
and time-of-use, by measuring code immediately before it isexecuted, and protects the
execution of the attested code by using a sand-boxing mechanism. It also binds the code
attestation with the data that it produces. It requires programmer annotations, and runs
within a Secure Kernel that is available in the newLaGrande Technology(LT) -style CPUs.
6.6 Terra
Terra [7] is a virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing.
The Terra Trusted VMM (TVMM), partitions a single platform into multiple isolated
virtual machines. Using a TVMM, existing OSes and applications can run in an “open-box
VM” or a “closed-box VM.” The privacy and integrity of the contents of a closed-box VM
are protected by the TVMM. The TVMM also allows applicationsto attest their software
stack to remote parties. Attestation is done by decomposingattestable entities into fixed-





In this research, we described the design and implementatioof a prototype system, that
will serve as a defense toward the TOCTOU limitation of the TCG/TPM architecture. Once
deployed, the integrity measurements of a TPM-protected system, will more reliably be
able to be trusted. The TPM will be capable of indicating the tampering of memory con-
taining trusted data.
7.2 Conclusion
The goal of this thesis was, to demonstrate flaws and limitations n the current TCG/TPM
architecture. In the course of this research, we made the following contributions:
• We pointed out that current assumptions made about measuredmemory at run-time is
flawed. Specifically, that previously measured memory can bemodified at run-time,
in a way that is undetectable by the TPM.
• We demonstrated a few software-based TOCTOU attacks on measured memory, and
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exhibited ways to detect such attacks – by monitoring the relevant PTEs and physical
frames of RAM.
• We applied our prototype to verify the integrity of data associated with an application.
We also suggested and implemented ways to associate data with the process that owns
it, so as to prevent unauthorized use of it.
• Our recommendation is to have a closer binding between the MMU and the TPM, so




This appendix contains various technical details relatingto our prototype.
A.1 Virtual machine configuration file
Shown below is the configuration file for virtual machine Domain-1. The Domain is named














Listed here are the steps carried out for each of the attacks and defenses described in Sec-
tion 4.1:
• Ensure that the virtual TPM backend driver is available in Domain-0. If not statically
compiled into the Kernel, the module can be loaded using the command:
modprobe tpmbk
This will make available a character device:
/dev/vtpm
which is where the vTPM listens for requests.
• Start the virtual TPM manager daemon in Domain-0. The command to do that is:
vtpm_managerd
• Launch the virtual machine that will function as the test machine. The command for
that is:
xm create -c /etc/xen/vm01-config.sxp
This virtual machine should be TPM-enabled, i.e., the TPM frontend driver must be
compiled for its Kernel, and in its configuration file it should specify that it would
like to be associated with a vTPM instance using the command line:
vtpm = [’instance=<instance number>, backend=<domain id>’]
as shown in the configuration file above.
• Once the guest machine is started, we need the TPM frontend driver to be activated.




This will make available a character device:
/dev/tpm0
• In Domain-0, we load a process that waits for an interrupt (VIRQ TAMPER) from the
hypervisor. The interrupt indicates tampering of trusted memory.
• We start the victim process in Domain-1. On being loaded intomemory, the PTEs/frames
mapping its code section are reported to the hypervisor
• We attack the above process by inserting a Kernel module intoDomain-1, that ma-
nipulates PTEs/frames of the process. This tampering is detected by the hypervisor.
• The hypervisor upcalls into Domain-0 to indicate this tampering. On receiving this
upcall, i.e., the interrupt, our ‘invalidating process’ updates a specific PCR in the
virtual TPM of Domain-1 with a random value.
• In Domain-1, the updated PCR values can be seen using the following command:
cat /sys/devices/xen/vtpm-0/pcrs
A.3 Important files modified
For hooking into the page-table update code
xen-3.0.3_0-src/xen/arch/x86/mm.c









A.4 Binding secrets and data to processes
Current Implementation




2. Loadkey <parent keyhandle> <encrypted key blob file>
↓
keyhandle to loaded key












Sealfile [options] <keyhandle> <input file> <outputfile> <CR3 value>
↓
New encrypted blob(key blob + CR3)
2. LoadSignKey <parent keyhandle> <new encrypted blob> <input file>
<output file> <CR3 value>
↓
Unsealfile <keyhandle> <new encrypted blob> <outputfile> <CR3 value>
↓
<outputfile>( encrypted blob + stored CR3 ) == <CR3> passed in
↓ ↓






A.5 Sample source code
Below is the listing ofvirt to phys(), which is a function to walk the page-tables in
software.
static unsigned long virt_to_phys(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start_addr,






unsigned long ret = 0UL;
unsigned long addr = start_addr;
int i = 0;
int garbage;
/*iterate through pages*/
for(addr = start_addr; addr <= end_addr; addr += 4096)
{
pgd = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, addr);
ptep = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
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